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The Man Who Stood Up to China
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Ambassador-elect Henry Bensurto Jr. talks about the patriotism of the late Albert del Rosario and the former Philippine foreign secretary stood up to China.
Christian Esguerra
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Run time: 41:35
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Video Transcript / Subtitles:( AI generated. About AI subtitles » )
00:00.0
... Nakikiramay tayo sa pamilya at mga kaibigan ni former Foreign Secretary Alberto Rosario. Ngayon gabi pag-usapan natin ang kanyang importanteng contributions bilang isa sa mga pinakamagaling diplomats natin sa Pilipinas at sa kanyang contribution in particular sa ating arbitral victory sa Permanent Court of Arbitration sa Dahig.
00:24.0
... Si Ambassador Henry Ben Surto, siya ang ating ambassador sa Turkey. Siya ang naging lead counsel ng Department of Foreign Affairs component of the Philippine legal team relating to the South China Sea arbitration.
00:38.0
... At sa same time siya rin ang naging tagapamuno ng West Philippine Sea Center ng DFA at isa siyang close advisor kay former Foreign Secretary Alberto Rosario sa isya ng South China Sea. Siya rin ang naging lead negotiator on the proposed Code of Conduct on the South China Sea.
01:08.0
... Pero ambassador-designate pa lang naman kasi I still have to be confirmed by the commission I don't want to pursue.
01:38.0
Q&A
02:09.0
... So sa katanungan mo Christian, una kami nagkakilala ni Secretary del Rosario nung ako ay nakabase sa Washington DC as First Secretary and Legal Officer. Then he was assigned as an ambassador. Ito mga up to 2005 magkasama kami doon sa Washington DC.
02:35.0
... At ang una po namin actually pinagtulungan ay ang protektahan ng sovereignty ng Pilipinas doon sa far overreaching criminal jurisdiction ng Department of Justice ng United States at the time doon sa telecommunication companies natin.
02:58.0
... Actually ang kanyang pag-ibig sa ating bayan at protektahan ang ating sovereignty, hindi lang ito sa bansang karating natin dito sa North, but even with whoever.
03:28.0
... Ang ating kaibigang bansa, Department of Justice. Sa awa naman po ng Diyos kami naman po ay nanaig at sa makikita po ninyo ang ating telecommunication, ang mga executives are able to go to the United States without threat of being arrested.
03:51.0
... So that was the first time. Then we parted ways and years after nung bumalik na ako sa Washington DC, muli kami nagkasama this time sa issue ng South China Sea at kung paano natin tindigan, tayoan ang ating kaliaan at karapatan sa West Philippine Sea in the context po doon sa nangyayari at the time.
04:21.0
... Gusto, medyo ayaw ipagamit sa atin ang mga dagat na nasa ating kamay.
04:51.0
Q&A
05:14.0
Ang ganda po nung istorya. Every year nagpaparticipate tayo sa ASEAN meetings. At the time, hindi naman po talaga gusto natin at ni Secretary nadali ng China sa third party adjudication.
05:34.0
Aniniwala po siya na ma-re-resolve natin ito at dapat i-resolve natin ito sa pag-uusap. Very sincere naman po and for us to be able to solve this, kailangan maging tapat tayo sa isa't isa.
05:50.0
Kaya naman po nung pagpunta sa ASEAN, nag-decide siya behind the scene po. Every year nagpaparticipate tayo. Mayroon ng mga prepared speeches. Pero on the eve, nagkaroon kami ng meeting. Tinanong niyo po lahat kami, marami po doon, ano ba ang tamang dapat gawin?
06:12.0
Mayroon nag-decide po kami, dapat ba tayong manahimik o dapat tayong magsalita? At kung magsasalita tayo tungkol sa South China Sea, ano ang dapat natin sabihin? So tinanong niyo po lahat kung ano ang tama. Lahat po nagsabi yun ang tama. Kaya lang pag sinabi natin yung totoo, Mr. Secretary baka magkagulo kasi first time.
06:40.0
Pero ano yung tama? And there was unanimity among the group. And then he decided, medyo sa English ko na because ito yung exact ano niya. If that is what is right, we will do what is right.
06:54.0
So orang mismo po, everybody was given the instruction, revise all the speeches. Imagine niyo po ang daming araw na pinagpaguran, bagbaguhin po in a matter of 2-3 hours. Because this time we will be truthful, we will be sincere.
07:15.0
We will be friends but friends who will be sincere in our articulation. And yung sincerity po na yan, sabihin sa ating bansa sa Norte na kaibigan, gusto rin namin makipagkaibigan sa inyo pero mahirap natin makipagkaibigan kung yung paan ninyo tinatapakan yung paan namin. Parang ganito yun sa akin.
07:40.0
Anong year po ulit? And ano yung setting?
07:42.0
I think it was 20, I think ito po yung ASEAN ministerial meeting sa Bali I think.
07:53.0
Ministerial meeting level 2, although high level na rin. Binangyari na talaga rin. Anong year po?
07:58.0
I think it was 2011. And that's when he started to speak in very sincere, very friendly but serious. Ano po ang magalang, alam niyo naman po maglumanay magsalita sa Secretary. Wala naman po siyang sinabi na sama.
08:20.0
Kaya alam po nilabas niya na para ma-resolve natin itong problema, kailangan natin pag-usapan. At ang problema na dapat natin pag-usapan, yung 9-line claim.
08:34.0
So yun po ang start noon and then alam niyo po parang dahil first time po yun maraming nabigla parang ang Pilipinas naging paraya. Somehow kasi parang hindi ganun eh. This is different from what we usually do.
08:53.0
So pag-uhin po namin, syempre dahil parang mabigat po yun. Again, nagpulong uli po kami pagbalik namin sa meeting na yan at pinapag-usapan po namin para ma-assess kung ano nangyari.
09:11.0
And then ang assessment po baka yung mga ibang bansa hindi kaagad sumuporta sa atin at baka mag-isa tayo. Baka mag-isa tayo magsasalita tungkol dito. Ang sabi niya po at ito ang napag-usapan, under his leadership, if this is the right thing to do, we will do what is right even if we are going to do this alone.
09:41.0
Ang objective po sana mag-usat ng seryoso. Hindi po yung usapang pag-uusap pero wala namang objective o walang direction. Gusto niya pag-umupo talagang pag-usapan natin with the objective of really resolving.
09:58.0
Pero po tumatagal and there were efforts pero parang wala pong nangyayari and therefore at that point I think there were discussions already and he was also in coordination with the President. Maybe we need to open our minds now to other possibilities.
10:20.0
Maybe in addition to the bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, we have to think about other creative options. And that one of those creative options is the possibility of bringing our northern neighbor to a third party adjudication.
10:39.0
So nagbigay siya ng instruction na pag-aralan ito. But at the same time we continue to push and we continue to talk with China to somehow agree with us to negotiate seriously the issue of the South China Sea.
11:09.0
But it's very clear na wala naman talagang patutunguhan yung pag-uusap. Parang ikot lang tayo ng ikot. And in the meantime na ikot ng ikot tayo sa pag-uusap, nawawala yung atin. So there has to be a willed decision to protect what is ours.
11:30.0
So the question that was left for us to explore eventually led to the arbitration. And by the time we now have a clarity essentially of what to do. And the President gave the go signal the following year in January 2013 on the day, on the very day that this was decided by the President at that time.
12:00.0
And by this Cabinet and other consultants, it was decided that we have to now do what needs to be done, which is resorting to third party adjudication. And that was January 2013.
12:26.0
Pero tama po ba as early as 2011 talagang sinabi ni Sec. Del Rosario pag-aralan yung possibility na magsampan ng kaso sa Permanent Court of Arbitration?
12:38.0
Tama po. Kasi at the time may proseso kami na pag-aralan ng gusto yung issue na ito and then see the entire landscape and then study what are the options essentially that are available to us.
12:58.0
And that's why we are doing the seriousness of the issue and the gravity and the enormity of the challenge. And so hindi po linear, hindi po one track mind. It was a very broad appreciation of all possible options for the country.
13:23.0
So noong binalala po natin yung issue, yung kaso sa Permanent Court of Arbitration noong January 2013, alam natin, kumusta naman yung naging role ni Sec. Del Rosario doon sa pag-harmonize ng Philippine position?
13:38.0
Kasi marami inputs po yan from many different components of ating team.
13:44.0
Totoo po yan. I think one thing that you can attribute to the Sec. during this time was yung kanyang focus, yung kanyang strong will. And as soon as we did this, nakatutok po talaga siya rito.
14:03.0
And he became a unifying factor essentially. Of course, with the President at the time because the chief architect of the foreign policy is always the President, whoever is the sitting President.
14:16.0
And so the Secretary would always coordinate this with the President, explain essentially what's happening and what are the options for us. And so yung kanyang role po, he is at the center essentially in terms of harmonizing, consolidating our position.
14:41.0
Because I just want to take note that the arbitration path was just one of the components of our foreign policy. It was not the entire, the arbitration was not the entire policy. Rather, the arbitration was part of the overall framework.
15:02.0
Which at the time, we have termed it as the principled foreign policy because it is anchored on doing what is right. At least, that is the perspective of the Secretary. So he was always guided by this principle every time we have a discussion on the South China Sea.
15:24.0
Q. Sir, yung role ni Secretary del Rosario, sa mga pagkakataon na habang na-litigate to sa PCA, medyo nagkakainitan yung mga member ng Philippine team as to how to approach certain issues. How did they handle those?
15:40.0
The Secretary handled it very well. I think he has both the intelligence and the character. He speaks with a very soft voice, but very strong willed essentially. And because you see the high moral tone in what he speaks, he's able to command respect.
16:10.0
And obviously, there will be different perspectives that will be put on the table. And the Secretary has a unifying power to put us all together in the same direction. But the Secretary also has the humility. He understands his own limitations.
16:34.0
He provided the political will there in those discussions. But at the same time, he listens also to the expert opinion. And he recognizes that all of us operate within our area of expertise.
16:52.0
And therefore, took that into account and never substituted his own understanding and will on matters of technical and legal. And so he will take the cue. He will try to understand the political and legal aspect of this and then bring in his own political calculations.
17:14.0
And so with those combinations, we're able to craft an option and a direction that was doable, even if sometimes very challenging. And his character willed all of us through all of those challenges and brought us to the logical conclusion of the arbitration process.
17:41.0
Can you talk about a particular sticking point, kunsaan talagang nagka-initan as to how to move forward and papano pumasok yung ano sa Secretary del Rosario?
17:52.0
Well, ang issue po, of course, there were several contentious issues. On the matter of Ito Aba, for example, the question of whether or not to include it in our submission. Is it something that we need to address or not?
18:13.0
Obviously, there will be differences and we accept that the Secretary accepted that. We accept that there will be different perspectives on this. But at the same time, he also believed that Ito Aba issue was the elephant in the room.
18:30.0
And therefore, as the elephant in the room, it is something that cannot be simply ignored. And so from his perspective, it was something that we have to address. And he believed in that and put his idea on the table.
18:49.0
We made a presentation to the President at the time, as well as the other individuals who would have their own opinion. And we're very grateful that the President eventually listened to that perspective.
19:07.0
And I think on hindsight now, that decision to include Ito Aba, I think, was the right thing to do. Because from the legal perspective, it resolved the issue in its entirety, more or less, without leaving any doubt as to whether certain areas are disputed or not.
19:36.0
And it is because of that clarity and decision to include Ito Aba that now we can say, as a consequence of that arbitral ruling, that if the Philippines has something like 550,000 square kilometers of exclusive economic zone and another 550,000 square kilometers of continental shelf, that's over a million of maritime entitlement.
20:05.0
And then we say that prior to the arbitral ruling, more than 500,000 square kilometers of our EEC and another more than 500,000 square kilometers of our continental shelf were disputed.
20:22.0
Now, because of the arbitral ruling, and specifically because we put in also the issue of Ito Aba, now we can say that the only remaining dispute in the South China Sea is about 13,000 square kilometers. 13,000 square kilometers out of 550,000 square kilometers of EEC.
20:50.0
And that's very small. And the consequence of that, that means we were able to recover a huge area of our exclusive economic zone. And what that means is that it is exclusively for Filipino fishermen. That's our right.
21:07.0
And more importantly, Recto Bank or Reed Bank is exclusively ours. There is no doubt as to who has exclusive rights or sovereign rights over Reed Bank. It's not disputed.
21:26.0
Michif Reef is also not a disputed area. It is exclusively ours, including the Second Thomas Shoal. And I think this clarity would not have been possible if Ito Aba was not included. Because Ito Aba was not resolved, meaning to say that China can still project 200 from Ito Aba.
21:54.0
From Ito Aba. And it will overlap with us.
21:57.0
It will impact Reed Bank and it will impact a large area of our exclusive economic zone. And China can always argue. Merely for purpose of argument, it's disputed. And therefore, as being disputed, you cannot unilaterally explore and exploit that without their consent.
22:21.0
We have the exclusive right to decide how and what to do with that.
22:29.0
I hope those who are watching and listening to us can follow. The explanation of Ambassador Henry V. Surto is very clear. It's very clear. The accounts are clear.
22:41.0
It's very clear in the law what our maritime entitlements are in our exclusive economic zone.
22:47.0
Papala sir, siyempre sa mga reports, hindi tamang sabihin, disputed West Philippine Sea, dahil malinaw ito sa ruling ng Permanent Court of Arbitration. Tama po ba?
23:01.0
Tama po. The clarification that came about of that ruling, the consequence of that, yung area na dapat disputed, hindi na disputed.
23:15.0
In fact, it was very clear in the ruling that it is exclusively our continental shelf, Reed Bank, for example. So, gano'ng kaklaro.
23:29.0
And so, it's wrong not to say they are disputed. There's no more dispute that has been clarified. In fact, if I may go further, we should no longer be talking about dispute because there's no dispute anymore on that.
23:43.0
Although China's strategy is to bring back that dispute by not posturing that they don't agree, of course. But legally, they're not disputed anymore.
23:56.0
Second, we should not be talking of the Nine-Dash Line anymore because that has been decided.
24:02.0
On what basis?
24:03.0
So, they should now be buried six feet under the ground. And we should be moving forward on how now to put into effect the decision, the points decided by the arbitral ruling.
24:33.0
So, it's like, if you're not pushing the idea of, there's no technically enforcement mechanism, the ruling of the PCA. But if you get your friends, your allies together toward this legal victory, parang marami siya strategies na binabanggit.
24:49.0
Can you talk about certain points or low points as far as possible frustrations or concerns after na napanalo na natin ito? Meron bang naikwento sa inyo sa Secretary or nababanggit?
25:00.0
One can understand. First, I think every political administration will have their own concept and we have to take that into account because that's how democracy operates.
25:17.0
And we know that foreign policy is always conducted by the person who is responsible at the helm. And obviously, that is always the president. And so, from the perspective of professional diplomacy, we have to be able to perceive that and do whatever we can to help.
25:37.0
And part of helping really is providing inputs to the decision makers so that our decision makers are not blindsided. So, we call a spades tape and within the process, put that on the table so that those who will decide based on what is provided them will see the entire landscape.
26:00.0
And so, there will be no blindsides. What we don't want to happen is to narrow it down to only those options where we are biased. We have to be able to see the entire landscape. And that was the purpose of the Secretary from my perspective when he puts all of these suggestions on the table,
26:22.0
giving some ideas to the political decision makers in terms of what are the possible options. And I think it is from that perspective. Obviously, humanly speaking, if we see it should be done this way and it's not done that way,
26:46.0
obviously, it causes a certain disappointment, especially the Secretary felt very strongly on certain options. And he was talking about these options from the perspective of experience because the Secretary was not talking from a perspective of vacuum. So, he was not operating on a vacuum here.
27:08.0
He had a historical experience together and with that experience, his own evaluation and he was putting it on the table. He really just wanted to be helpful. That's my perception. Although, sometimes these helpful things may be taken differently, but I think that from the perspective of the Secretary, he has a very sincere appreciation.
27:34.0
In fact, if I may, because I saw him last week before he left. I could in all sincerity indicate how the Secretary was very happy with the policy approach of the President and he was appreciative of that.
27:59.0
And so, the Secretary del Rosario, from my perspective, was not being ideological. He was not saying no because he wanted to say no or he wanted to say yes because he actually tries to understand regardless of who articulates that.
28:17.0
And so, I think in that informal chat with the Secretary, he did express his satisfaction and his appreciation. The word he used, and I will say this, I think the President is doing well and I appreciate that.
28:39.0
Yes, the educating, the balancing act, how the President is looking at the national interest essentially. You know, it's a big burden. It's a serious burden on the shoulder of whoever is going to make a decision.
29:01.0
And Secretary del Rosario understands that because he once upon a time had that responsibility. I've seen that happen many times. If I may recall one incident, Christian, if you don't mind.
29:17.0
The first time he presented our political framework for consideration by ASEAN. I went to his room to have a one last discussion with him. We normally do that before we proceed. You know, I know that he was very seriously concerned about how this will transpire.
29:42.0
I'm talking of the framework of SOFICA. We were putting it for the first time. You know, he was praying the rosary. He was praying the whole day.
29:51.0
Ah, talaga?
29:53.0
People may not know this and Secretary del Rosario normally doesn't want to talk religion in a conversation. He doesn't want to appear righteous than anyone else. He respects the opinion of people, especially on religious matters.
30:12.0
He was very, very careful about that as to the privacy of people. But he's a very religious man. And every time there is a major event, he always has a rosary in his pocket. This I know.
30:26.0
And I know when a forthcoming event is something that he has very serious concern, that he will pray that rosary. He will have a silent moment in his room and he will do that rosary.
30:48.0
So pag nakita niyo yung rosary kay Secretary del Rosario, you know na mayroong very, very important decision to be made.
30:58.0
Yes, that I can say. And lastly, when he was going, in fact, he's normally not religious, but lastly he was very religious. He told me and he was excited, Henry, I'm going to San Francisco.
31:13.0
So I asked him, why are you going there? And he said, I'm going there to be with Our Lady. I'm quoting him exactly, to be with Our Lady. What do you mean, sir? I'm going to be with Our Lady in San Francisco for three days.
31:34.0
And I said, why? I've been there before, sir. What particular shrine? I'm not of that shrine. He said Our Lady of Miracle, something like that. And I said, I haven't heard of that. And he said, no, it's a, and he showed me the picture.
31:51.0
This is Our Lady of Miracle. It's a statute. And he said it will be brought to the house of his sister and he will lie there to spend time with Our Lady from Monday to Thursday. And he will not be doing anything outside of just being with Our Lady. Those are his words.
32:15.0
So he was a devotee of Mother Mary, the Virgin Mary?
32:21.0
As I mentioned, Christian, normally he will not be talking about religion, but last week he was extra sentimental and he was extra religious and he was looking forward to spending time with Our Lady.
32:40.0
So for me, it was an extraordinary conversation because the secretary spent a lot of time talking about Our Lady. As I mentioned, religion for him is a very private thing for every individual and he would be very careful to intrude into that privacy.
33:09.0
But he was very outspoken at the time.
33:14.0
How would you describe him as a diplomat? Because we see a lot of testimonials from him. But someone who actually worked with him very closely?
33:24.0
He's a diplomat extraordinaire from my perspective. Not only in terms of his character, how he conducts himself, the very character and the substance that he puts into the actions, into the things that he does.
33:46.0
Normally, he will walk the talk. One thing that makes the secretary very credible is his penchant to make sure that whenever he articulates or says something, he will try to make good of that.
34:07.0
So he's somebody that he will try his best to walk the talk. And I think that gives a lot of credibility and translate that personality in terms of diplomacy. Then you know how that kind of character and substance and demeanor would be able to command respect. And that's how it was.
34:32.0
On the time that I was with him as he conducts that diplomacy, I saw how he's able to command respect. And I think the evidence to that is the fact that we're able to move the country in terms of our diplomacy in very significant steps in the South China Sea,
34:55.0
in ASEAN, and in terms of other aspects of our conduct, diplomatic conduct. And much of that can be attributed to the secretary, his persona, his own character, his own demeanor, and his ability and his credibility and his ability to walk all the time.
35:26.0
And when you look at the substance of what he says, you can see the seriousness and the sincerity. And I think this is what other diplomats are able to see from the secretary, that sincerity that spills over.
35:45.0
And I think that impacts them. And it is that sincerity that, at the end of the day, was able to move policymakers from other countries to try to accommodate and somehow listen to our own articulation.
36:05.0
And if one is going to look at how the secretary was able to move ASEAN in terms of where we want ASEAN to go, empirically, you will see how much the secretary's impacted the direction of ASEAN.
36:23.0
If I may, for a long time, South China Sea was not part of the official agenda of ASEAN. If ever, it was only discussed on the side, but never part of an official agenda. And the reason for that is because obviously, China would not want this to be part of the agenda of ASEAN.
36:48.0
And then comes 2012, Cambodia, and it became a litmus test for us. And we stood, the secretary, with his leadership, we stood our ground for what is right, that even if there's no joint statement, we will not budge, we will not blink, because what we are articulating is what is right.
37:16.0
And so there was no joint statement that year. But you may notice, the year after that, the issue of South China Sea became part of the official agenda every year.
37:31.0
And to this day, the reason why we are able to discuss South China Sea in a very official way as part of the official agenda is primarily because of that. It was a heroic deed. And when that was done, the secretary got a lot of flak, and the term microphone diplomacy came into being.
37:58.0
A very pejorative, which is not true, really, because we were not safe. The secretary never, never badmouthed any country. He was sincere, but the sincerity was given that interpretation. It was more of a twist by critics.
38:22.0
But in all of those engagements, I have not seen the secretary badmouth anyone. But he was very straightforward in a very sincere way.
38:38.0
And at the end of the day, it was that sincerity that has brought the possibility of the problem now being resolved, or at least discussed seriously. Because how can you resolve a problem when you ignore it, when you don't even talk about it?
38:58.0
And it was he who was able to put that issue on the table as an important agenda. And as such, therefore, people will have to pay attention. And I think we are where we are now precisely because of those strong-willed articulations of the secretary.
39:26.0
Obviously, the president at the time, because the chief architect of every foreign policy of every administration should be the president. So as I praised the secretary, this is not meant to take away any credit from anyone. And so that's not the intention.
39:45.0
But solely from the perspective of the secretary, this is how I knew him. This is what I saw to the last end. The consistency, the constancy, the credibility, the integrity, and all of those helped the Philippines conduct its diplomacy at the highest level.
40:12.0
Indeed, Ambassador-designate Henry V. Surto, so many memories, so many things to remember the former secretary for. And sir, maraming maraming salamat po for taking the time to join us tonight. And I know, I invited you because I realized how important this is for you also as someone very close to the secretary. But sir, we thank you for talking to us about the secretary. Salamat po, sir.
40:39.0
Thank you also, Christian, and thank you for remembering the secretary. I think he's a real hero, a true hero. You, I, we might have lost a friend, but the country lost a hero, a good man, a national treasure.
41:05.0
And I think his works will reverberate in the long future, essentially. And it is my hope that future young generations of Filipinos can come back and study and learn from the secretary. Thank you very much.
41:27.0
Maraming salamat po, Ambassador-designate Henry V. Surto, sir. Thank you, thank you. Maraming salamat po sa inyo.