00:45.3
And obviously you're also the co-founder of the Marathon Initiative.
00:49.6
And you formerly also served as Director of the Defense Program at the CNAS, Center for New American Security.
00:55.6
But importantly we also want to talk about your book, Strategy of Denial.
01:00.4
So if I don't know, back in the day in the 50s some of the WASP intellectuals were talking about containment and now maybe Strategy of Denial is the new word in town.
01:11.3
How are you Elbridge? Thank you for joining us.
01:14.0
Great to be doing well. Richard, thanks for asking. Great to be with you and great to be on your show.
01:18.8
I know tremendous respect for your intellect and incisiveness and also you've got a tremendous reach.
01:24.3
So it's a pleasure to be and be able.
01:25.6
Let's speak to an audience that's so significant not only in Asia but around the world.
01:30.7
Thank you for that Elbridge.
01:31.8
Of course we hope to have you back in Asia soon.
01:33.9
Last time we crisscrossed I was back in the U.S. East Coast, West Coast.
01:37.6
You were in Asia but hopefully next time we can have you in person also in the region because your voice is extremely important.
01:43.9
The arguments you're making are increasingly becoming I think the mainstream understanding of not maybe in the U.S. but at least in this part of the world.
01:52.9
Yeah, I think it's sort of common sense in my view.
01:55.6
Yeah, common sense is controversial sometimes.
01:59.5
Welcome to the club. I mean of course.
02:02.6
Now Elbridge, obviously we can talk about elections and politics some other time.
02:07.8
This is not the time for that.
02:09.0
But I'm sure people who Google you will understand that you could once again be in a position, an important position in the coming years or so.
02:15.6
But regardless, it's your thoughts that matter.
02:18.1
First of all Elbridge, before we go because really what brought this discussion to forth is this latest supplementation.
02:25.6
The United States has announced a new federal emergency budget.
02:28.6
A huge part of that is going to Ukraine.
02:30.6
A significant part of course going also to Israel, your key allies in the Middle East.
02:33.6
And then there's a few billion dollars in the Indo-Pacific and some for the Philippines.
02:36.6
Now before I go there, I want people to first have...
02:39.6
They found it in the couch.
02:41.6
They're looking around in the couch. They found something for Asia.
02:44.6
Okay, we can have a conversation. Definitely.
02:46.6
I mean you saw me. I mean many people also disagree with me because you know my idea is let's push the envelope.
02:52.6
I mean the nature of threat is something else.
02:55.1
So I'm good to have kindred spirits in terms of appreciating the China factor if I can put it that way in a more neutral way.
03:03.1
But first let's start with your book, Strategy of Denial.
03:07.1
I mean to what degree was this informed by your role in shaping the national defense strategy of the former administration?
03:15.1
Tell me a little bit of the story about the frame of the national defense strategy.
03:18.1
I mean to the degree that it's not confidential.
03:20.1
How does it inform your book and what is your understanding of the reception of the book so far?
03:25.1
Sure, well thank you very much.
03:26.1
It's a little bit...
03:27.1
It's funny in a way because actually you know I played a role obviously others as well and certainly Secretary Mattis under President Trump, etc.
03:34.1
You know in a sense we already made the strategic shift in the most significant place which is the Department of Defense to focus on China, to focus on war fighting.
03:44.1
For those who are interested, there is the public version of the national defense strategy.
03:49.1
It's not necessarily a very accurate or kind of useful...
03:55.1
Because it's an unclassified summary.
03:58.1
It's not a direct version.
04:00.1
For those who are interested, I gave testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in the U.S. in 2019.
04:06.1
I think in early 2019.
04:08.1
And I laid out in my testimony, it's available online if you just Google it.
04:12.1
That gives you a kind of a sort of a breakdown of the national defense strategy of 2018.
04:18.1
And I think you know public statements from Secretary, Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan and Secretary of Defense Esper.
04:25.1
It's pretty clear.
04:26.1
I mean it's China focused on restoring the American military's war fighting edge in the face of movements primarily by China to a lesser degree by Russia.
04:34.1
To build up what were called A2AD bubbles, etc.
04:37.1
Kind of you know develop theories of victory to go after exposed U.S. allies, etc.
04:42.1
So you know I already had very strong ideas which I was pushing in the Pentagon.
04:47.1
Again you know success has many fathers rightly.
04:50.1
But where did the book come from?
04:53.1
The book came from my experience in the Pentagon.
04:55.1
Which is that the strategy had actually already changed.
04:58.1
But in a system like the American system in particular, although probably in any system,
05:03.1
you need to convince and explain especially when a document is not widely available
05:09.1
and itself is somewhat the product of bureaucratic compromise.
05:12.1
I will say that I have no reason to complain about the national defense strategy of 2018.
05:16.1
It's pretty darn clear for a bureaucratic document.
05:19.1
And I'm proud of that for whatever role I played.
05:23.1
But I also felt like somebody needs to make the case.
05:25.1
A clear case so that everybody understands.
05:27.1
And that's in the Pentagon.
05:29.1
It's military officers who are out in the field or are not working in the Pentagon and don't have access.
05:35.1
The allies from the Philippines and Japan and Australia and you know in NATO and in the Middle East.
05:41.1
It's our opponents.
05:43.1
I think that for instance the Chinese and the Russians should understand what we're trying to do and what we're not trying to do.
05:48.1
At least from my point of view.
05:49.1
Which is to understand that this is a limited strategy.
05:52.1
It's not a strangulation strategy.
05:54.1
It's not an existential threat to the future of China or Russia.
05:58.1
As much as we oppose their aggressive ambitions in places like Ukraine and potentially against Taiwan.
06:03.1
But there is a way, a balance of power model that I'm expressing to journalists, to members of Congress, to regular people.
06:10.1
For instance, one of the things I was most proud of is that my book was named audio book of the week by a truckers organization in the United States.
06:19.1
I was very proud of that because I worked very hard to make the book.
06:23.1
It's not easy but it's accessible to everybody.
06:26.1
I really hope that's true.
06:28.1
It's not trying to hide behind jargon or artificial complexity.
06:32.1
I'm a believer in being as parsimonious as you can.
06:36.1
And look, people who are driving trucks are boaters.
06:39.1
They play a critical national role in our economy.
06:45.1
And frankly, a lot of that kind of demographic are the people who have fought and will fight in the wars.
06:50.1
And those are a lot of the people who...
06:53.1
are most skeptical after 20 years of the forever wars, so to speak.
06:57.1
So that's why I wrote the book.
06:58.1
What's its reception?
06:59.1
That's for others to judge.
07:02.1
It seems to be getting traction.
07:04.1
It seems to still...
07:05.1
And in some ways, I think the book is more relevant now than when it came out three years ago.
07:10.1
It would have been better to have addressed the problems.
07:12.1
But we're sort of...
07:13.1
We're digging our hole further in my view.
07:15.1
We've made some progress but we're still heading towards the iceberg.
07:18.1
And that worries me a great deal, as you know.
07:23.1
What is the strategy of denial?
07:25.1
In what sense is this different from containment or even constrainment, which I've been using for quite some time?
07:31.1
What is different here?
07:33.1
Well, I would say it's a two-level...
07:35.1
Actually, a guy was doing a radio interview in LA.
07:37.1
He came up with a third.
07:38.1
The first denial is getting over the denial that, say, a Robert Kagan or a John Bolton exhibits,
07:43.1
which is that we are no longer in the unipolar world.
07:45.1
So that's the kind of first thing is the entering.
07:47.1
And that's how I start the book is to say America is no longer the unipolar power.
07:52.1
I'm wearing a hair shirt or lacerating myself out of guilt and Americans are in decline.
07:57.1
It's a fundamental reality and very apparent to anybody in Asia, of course, that China is rising but also India, ASEAN.
08:03.1
The overall global power situation is just not what it was in 1995.
08:07.1
So that's the first thing.
08:08.1
But then in terms of what the strategy is, it's a twofold.
08:12.1
And any sane and rational, totally moral military strategy should emerge from a sane and rational and moral geopolitical strategy for the country.
08:21.1
And that's what should be the proper goal of American foreign policy in a world in which we are not as dominant as we were.
08:29.1
And that is to deny any state the ability to dominate one of the key regions of the world, especially the most important one, which today is Asia.
08:37.1
75 years ago is Europe.
08:38.1
50 years ago is Europe.
08:39.1
Today, it's Asia as a product of economic reality.
08:41.1
Also, John Mearsheimer also has...
08:44.1
I mean, I think it's similar to that.
08:45.1
I mean, there are many things I agree with John Mearsheimer about.
08:48.1
There are some things I disagree with him about.
08:50.1
I have a lot of respect for his analysis and the courage of his convictions, even as I disagree with him on a number of issues.
08:56.1
But yeah, it's basically...
08:57.1
I mean, I would say John is probably...
09:00.1
He's a thoroughgoing offensive realist.
09:03.1
I wouldn't define myself as an offensive realist or a defensive realist.
09:06.1
It's kind of the view I don't think of myself as a hawk or a dove because these things are contextual.
09:10.1
I think of myself as a realist.
09:12.1
But the goal, which if you go back to George Kennan's speech at the National Defense University after World War II
09:17.1
or the work of Nicholas Spikeman during the Second World War,
09:20.1
that's the classic American goal.
09:22.1
And so it's kind of going back to those sort of original sources.
09:25.1
So that's geopolitical denial.
09:27.1
And then there's also the second meaning and third meaning is military denial,
09:30.1
which is to hold up that goal, which needs what I call an anti-hegemonic coalition.
09:35.1
You have to have a military force and capability, especially in that primary region, Asia, which will defend it.
09:42.1
What does that require?
09:43.1
Military denial, which is basically to defend our allies, including the Philippines.
09:47.1
Taiwan is a special case.
09:49.1
But against invasion by the potential hegemon, which is in this case, excuse me, which is China.
09:56.1
Thank you for that.
09:58.1
And how do you feel that the term strategy of denial is now being deployed,
10:03.1
sometimes with direct credit to you, maybe sometimes not as much, by people across the political spectrum?
10:08.1
I mean, from New Left Review to the Australian government, they're using the terminology.
10:12.1
How do you feel about that?
10:14.1
Aside from truck drivers listening to you.
10:16.1
Well, it's not about me.
10:18.1
The concept is really being accepted.
10:19.1
So it's interesting.
10:20.1
I mean, you mentioned the Australian government has actually mentioned it in its previous defense strategy.
10:25.1
But in the one they just released, they specifically say they're going to make a capitalized strategy of denial of the cornerstone of their defense plans.
10:32.1
Actually, the American government under the Biden administration has said a denial defense is going to be their military standard for Taiwan.
10:38.1
I believe Cath Hicks and I believe Colin Call, certainly Eli Ratner has said that.
10:43.1
The Japanese government has basically said words to that effect using concepts like denial of defense.
10:47.1
So concepts like denial, very similar to what I'm arguing.
10:50.1
And a shift even in Taiwan is more uneven, but the move towards the kind of porcupine idea is encouraging as well.
10:58.1
The way I think about it now is we've made enormous progress at the strategic conceptual level of how to think about the military strategy for Asia.
11:08.1
I think we've basically got the strategy right, and it's largely agreed, and it's not a partisan issue.
11:13.1
They may not give credit to me because I'm a Republican or they don't like me, whatever.
11:16.1
But as long as the ideas are getting through, that's the main – and I don't own these ideas, obviously.
11:21.1
So I want to see the ideas succeed most.
11:26.1
I'm not above wanting some credit and so forth, but the main thing is to see the ideas.
11:32.1
Where I'm more concerned is in the implementation.
11:36.1
And I would direct people's attention to a very good article by Ed Wong and a number of others in the New York Times that shows the immense progress that's happened.
11:46.1
In the U.S. or between the U.S. and its allies like the Philippines, Japan, Australia on posture.
11:52.1
But the key line in that piece is a comment from Sam Paparo, the new Indo-PACOM commander.
11:58.1
He says, we've been growing our combat capability here in the Pacific over the last years.
12:02.1
True, two thumbs up.
12:03.1
But then he goes on to say, but our trajectory is still not a trajectory that matches our adversary.
12:08.1
Our adversaries are building more capability, and they're building more warships per year than we are.
12:12.1
So it's all relative.
12:14.1
That's one concern.
12:15.1
And I think at the macro level, it's a very frustrating part of the debate, and I think you've probably seen this, Richard.
12:22.1
I don't have people directly challenging so much the applicability and appropriateness of a strategy of denial for the Pacific.
12:32.1
But people are basically thinking that we can do that while we are doing all the other things.
12:37.1
So it's not a direct challenge.
12:38.1
It's that people are thinking that we're still in the unipolar moment.
12:41.1
As President Biden says, we can do everything.
12:43.1
There are many Republicans who think that way as well.
12:45.1
And that's just not going to add up.
12:47.1
So the debate has moved from the realm of what's our right overall military strategy, I think.
12:53.1
Things like the anti-hegemonic coalition are forming.
12:56.1
It's now a matter of a prioritization, implementation, and kind of discipline.
13:02.1
And that's where I think things are now, unfortunately.
13:05.1
Well, for good or ill.
13:07.1
I mean, we're going to speak more about this issue of prioritization, which is everything.
13:10.1
I mean, the devil is really in the details, right?
13:12.1
You can agree in principle.
13:14.1
It's the operationalization that is everything.
13:16.1
But can I ask you first, because I want to talk about also your experience of dealing with the Philippines.
13:21.1
And we are going through massive transformation also here from Duterte to Marcos administration, as you obviously see.
13:28.1
But before that, can you tell me a little bit about your experience from serving in different Republican administrations?
13:34.1
I think you were there in the Bush administration.
13:38.1
Albeit at a very junior role.
13:40.1
And you're a very young guy.
13:41.1
So I think people can guess this is not Bush senior.
13:43.1
I'm older than I look, but thank you.
13:45.1
So can you tell me about the evolution of American foreign policy, including Republican foreign policy throughout these two decades from Iraq war all the way to the latest developments in Asia?
13:55.1
Well, let me start a little bit farther back because I think that's an excellent question.
13:59.1
And maybe I'll focus particularly on Republican foreign policy because actually a lot of my time I spend debating other Republicans.
14:06.1
It's not that I don't disagree with the Democrats in various ways.
14:12.1
But for various reasons, I often end up debating with other Republicans.
14:17.1
I think if you go back historically, obviously during the Second World War and immediately after, there was a strong faction of kind of genuine isolationist Republicans.
14:28.1
I think that group, that idea really, you know, kind of fell by the wayside as of probably like the early 1950s, if not before.
14:39.1
What was became of that group?
14:42.1
I think the dominant foreign policy I would say for the Republican administrations of Eisenhower and Nixon was what I would actually identify myself with.
14:51.1
So you have a lot of prominent commentators or members of Congress like Senator McConnell will say that there is an isolationist wing and frame this as between internationalists and isolationists.
15:01.1
I actually think that's a false dichotomy.
15:03.1
The economists did a very good job framing what I think the real Republican spectrum of opinion is in an issue a couple of weeks ago based on some work by the U.S. Congress.
15:12.1
The U.S. Congress is the European Council on Foreign Relations which is primacists, basically people who think the United States should be the global hegemon on one extreme and restrainers or even isolationists.
15:21.1
I don't like to use the term isolationist because I think it's unfair to them on the other extreme.
15:25.1
There are some who are probably genuine isolationists, many of them are just kind of much more loathes to use military force.
15:31.1
And then in the middle are what they call the prioritizers and I'm identified with that group.
15:34.1
I think if you look back and say like President Eisenhower and President Nixon, that's much closer to this kind of prioritizing.
15:41.1
This kind of prioritizer model.
15:43.3
Yeah, and even as late as the 90s,
15:45.4
it's worth remembering that Bob Dole ran in 1996
15:48.6
against President Clinton against Democrat wars.
15:52.1
So during the Cold War, most of the wars broke out
15:55.6
under Democrats, under President Truman.
15:58.1
I mean, fairly or not,
15:59.2
I mean, it's a kind of partisan point, really,
16:01.1
but bear in mind that under President Truman,
16:03.4
for instance, who's now lionized,
16:05.1
he was very unpopular by the end of his administration
16:08.0
because the war in Korea had broken out.
16:09.7
It was seen as very unsatisfactory.
16:11.4
A lot of people were killed.
16:13.0
And the defense spending was about 12% to 13%,
16:17.1
So when President Eisenhower came into office,
16:19.5
he was running on cutting the defense budget.
16:22.2
And actually, President Eisenhower's goal
16:24.0
was to have U.S. troops largely out of Europe
16:26.2
within about a decade or so.
16:28.1
We can go back and look at the record.
16:29.6
But bear in mind, President Eisenhower, he was a mix.
16:31.5
There was some hawkish elements,
16:32.7
certainly Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
16:34.5
was quite hawkish,
16:35.8
and part of the Republican constituency was very hawkish.
16:39.7
President Eisenhower himself, I think,
16:40.8
usually landed on a priority.
16:43.9
He was very conscious of constrained resources.
16:46.2
He was very conscious of political will.
16:48.2
Of course, famously, he did not...
16:49.9
He chose not to intervene in Indochina in 1954
16:52.6
when the French position collapsed.
16:55.7
And then if you go to President Nixon,
16:58.2
you know, President Nixon,
16:59.4
this is something relevant certainly in Southeast Asia,
17:01.2
a place like Vietnam,
17:02.3
of course, Vietnam and Philippines, etc.,
17:05.4
was famously the Nixon Doctrine,
17:07.1
which was also very acutely conscious
17:09.7
of the matching the resources
17:11.5
and political will available to our commitments
17:13.5
and very similar in a sense, I think,
17:15.9
to what President Trump has been calling for,
17:17.5
which is allies assuming more responsibility,
17:21.9
you know, kind of regional sheriff model.
17:24.7
The Republican Party changed a lot under President Reagan.
17:27.8
President Reagan was very...
17:29.7
In some sense, he ran
17:31.3
and his background was from the much more
17:34.0
sort of rollback wing of the Republican Party,
17:38.8
more existential.
17:41.6
That's where he ran from.
17:43.2
The way he actually governed,
17:44.7
and it's complicated because of the role of people like George Shultz
17:47.6
and also the political environment after Vietnam,
17:49.8
he actually did not use the American military very much, right?
17:52.2
I mean, he intervened in Granada and Lebanon
17:54.1
and those were the two examples.
17:56.3
So President Reagan's rhetoric
17:57.9
was very aggressive and high,
18:03.2
for various reasons,
18:05.4
were quite selective
18:07.0
and it really was a piece of strength.
18:09.5
and was criticized by the hawks for this,
18:11.5
engaged with Mikhail Gorbachev
18:14.8
to end the Cold War.
18:19.0
that they didn't know the Soviet Union was going to collapse.
18:21.0
The Cold War actually ended probably around 1986-87,
18:24.0
even really before the collapse of the Soviet Empire,
18:26.6
certainly by 1989.
18:27.9
So the Union only collapsed in 1991.
18:29.8
Now, what happened,
18:30.5
and I'll get to your question,
18:32.0
is after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
18:34.7
I would say a kind of neo-Reaganite view
18:37.4
became dominant in the Republican Party.
18:38.8
And Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan,
18:41.2
it's not an accident,
18:42.0
they were two of the biggest advocates,
18:43.2
wrote a famous article in Foreign Affairs
18:45.1
that reflected that view.
18:46.9
That came into ascendancy or hegemony
18:50.3
within the Republican Party
18:51.2
with the George W. Bush administration,
18:53.6
which was the purest form of maximalist,
18:56.6
global liberal hegemony.
18:58.1
Full-spectrum dominance.
18:59.2
Full-spectrum dominance,
19:00.9
use of military force unilaterally if necessary.
19:06.1
So when people say,
19:07.2
oh, they're critics of...
19:10.5
are trying to overthrow
19:12.1
the whole post-World War II order and approach,
19:16.1
What Republican...
19:17.3
I think a lot of Republicans,
19:18.7
certainly I am opposing,
19:20.8
is the George W. Bush neo-Reaganite,
19:23.5
which is not even Reagan himself,
19:26.3
And that's very important to understand.
19:29.4
You know, because...
19:31.3
Look, my view is the last 25 years
19:33.8
of American foreign and economic policy
19:35.4
have been a disaster.
19:36.8
And I say this as a Republican,
19:38.8
I have to give Bill Clinton quite a bit of credit.
19:41.1
By the end of the 1990s,
19:43.3
the U.S. had a balanced budget.
19:45.0
China was a blip on the horizon militarily.
19:48.0
We were the world's largest economy.
19:50.5
Social cohesion was pretty darn good.
19:53.2
Crime was at historic lows,
19:55.2
et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
19:56.8
Following 25 years,
19:59.7
which was not in anybody's control,
20:02.2
trillions of dollars,
20:03.3
thousands of people,
20:04.4
or tens of thousands of people wounded,
20:06.6
killed in the Middle East wars,
20:08.8
financial crisis,
20:10.7
worse since the Great Depression,
20:14.1
et cetera, et cetera.
20:16.7
among Republicans and Democrats
20:19.8
to the opposition
20:21.1
to the neo-Reaganite foreign policy
20:23.7
And so this gets to the point here
20:25.3
is what I'm trying to do
20:26.9
is both at the strategic level,
20:28.9
but also at the political and fiscal level,
20:31.3
is to grapple with the reality
20:32.9
of where the trajectory
20:34.1
in not only among Republicans,
20:35.6
but I think largely among independents and Democrats,
20:37.7
which is anti-interventionism,
20:38.8
is akin to a post-Vietnam spirit.
20:42.7
a lot of these neo-Reaganites
20:43.8
just say we need another Reagan to emerge
20:45.7
and then we'll just be able
20:47.1
to solve all of our problems.
20:48.3
But the reality is
20:49.0
that we're not where we were in 1980.
20:50.8
Our fiscal situation is far worse.
20:53.5
Our demographics are different.
20:54.9
And we're facing China,
20:56.0
which was far more powerful
20:58.0
than the Soviet Union actually was,
20:59.7
certainly in economic capacity.
21:01.4
So that's sort of, I think,
21:02.4
the right way to understand
21:03.3
what's going on politically
21:04.5
in terms of the foreign policy divide.
21:06.4
I mean, thanks for pointing that out
21:08.4
because, you know,
21:08.8
I see some continuity
21:09.9
between Nixon's approach.
21:11.8
I mean, having regional gendarmerie,
21:13.9
having a detente with China
21:15.3
to isolate the Soviet Union,
21:17.0
and then later on,
21:17.9
Bill Clinton saying something
21:19.1
along the lines of,
21:20.3
you know, we're not going to be
21:21.3
number one forever.
21:22.7
So while we're kind of
21:23.8
in the number one position,
21:25.5
let's negotiate a structured future
21:28.9
and American interests
21:30.1
could be protected.
21:31.5
your prioritization approach
21:33.5
is kind of mirroring
21:34.9
this interesting overlap
21:36.5
between how Bill Clinton
21:39.2
understood the future
21:40.2
of the world order.
21:40.5
I think that's right.
21:41.3
And actually, you know,
21:42.2
I have some overlap right now
21:43.9
with the administration
21:45.6
on like China policy.
21:47.5
talking to the Chinese president.
21:48.7
Trump has said he'd be open
21:49.7
to talking to Xi Jinping.
21:50.8
I think that's good.
21:51.3
As James Baker used to say,
21:52.9
it's more important to talk to your,
21:54.0
you know, it's most important
21:54.8
to talk to your enemies.
21:57.0
you need to communicate to.
21:58.2
So just talking to your friends
21:59.4
is not doing diplomacy.
22:02.7
unlike all the Democrats,
22:03.8
I have pretty low expectations
22:05.7
of what that can achieve.
22:08.5
I think that the key thing there
22:10.1
is what is in the best interest
22:12.0
of the American people.
22:12.7
So the neo-Reaganite crowd
22:14.5
oh, America's a superpower.
22:15.6
We have to act like a superpower.
22:16.6
And I always go back,
22:18.9
in the Constitution
22:19.6
or the Declaration of Independence
22:20.5
that we have to be a superpower.
22:21.6
It's good to be a superpower,
22:23.5
But the most important thing
22:24.5
is for the American people
22:30.3
I think that's the thing.
22:31.9
And if we are no longer
22:33.0
the world's number one
22:35.0
dominant superpower,
22:36.4
that's not necessarily,
22:37.0
I think America wants
22:39.9
but that doesn't require
22:41.5
dominating everybody else.
22:43.2
And that's the difference
22:43.8
between, say, my view
22:44.6
and, say, the John Bolton view
22:47.3
I mean, I think you can see
22:48.6
in how I engage in the public
22:50.4
and I make this point
22:52.5
whenever I have the opportunity.
22:53.6
I'm not trying to humiliate them.
22:55.1
I'm trying not to hold them down.
22:58.1
and this is basic
22:59.0
core American idea,
23:00.2
but also balance,
23:00.8
they're very strong.
23:02.6
And you can't take their amount
23:04.7
So we have to balance them.
23:06.1
But I'm not in the,
23:07.0
I'm not saying that
23:10.0
successful and rising
23:12.9
if diplomacy is just for friends,
23:14.3
then you don't need diplomacy.
23:17.1
That's why diplomacy is made.
23:21.5
we talk about your
23:23.6
U.S.-Philippine relations,
23:24.8
and then we go bigger
23:27.0
the regional strategy again.
23:30.9
so over the past few weeks
23:32.5
and back and forth,
23:36.0
I see some interesting
23:37.2
convergence in terms
23:38.9
we're talking about
23:39.4
very different states,
23:40.6
very different blobs,
23:41.7
very different understandings.
23:43.9
general understanding
23:46.7
let's just say folks
23:47.4
who are more tuned in
23:48.4
into world affairs
23:50.6
of American power,
23:51.7
but also the kind of
23:52.6
realism that you have to have.
23:54.4
But at the same time,
23:56.2
significant difference.
23:57.6
I think there are parts
23:59.1
which are very confident
24:00.2
about your position
24:03.1
probably even in more
24:06.6
a lot of despondency
24:10.5
is somewhere in the middle.
24:12.0
enough of middle America
24:13.5
in a strategic sense,
24:15.8
electoral political sense,
24:17.8
can come together?
24:20.6
American foreign policy
24:21.5
is going to depend
24:22.0
on the presidency.
24:23.7
my political strategy
24:26.0
the foreign policy
24:30.1
to come into play
24:31.0
is not to convince
24:31.8
the majority of senators
24:34.2
including the Republican Party
24:37.5
the neo-Reaganite
24:38.4
sort of dispensation.
24:39.5
And the reality is
24:40.8
that the only person
24:42.0
in the American system
24:42.8
who has ultimate responsibility
24:44.0
for foreign policy
24:44.8
is the president.
24:45.4
As Harry Truman said,
24:46.6
the buck stops here.
24:48.1
senators can go on television
24:51.8
obviously they have power
24:54.0
but it's a kind of
24:55.5
or an authorization power
24:57.2
or appropriateness.
24:58.1
It's very indirect.
25:00.0
with respect, of course.
25:01.1
But the president's
25:01.9
the one ultimately responsible.
25:04.2
that there's going to be
25:04.6
some political movement
25:08.1
form policy of prioritization.
25:09.7
That's not going to happen
25:10.4
for obvious reasons.
25:11.8
But I think a self-irrational
25:14.6
who's thinking about
25:15.3
what's best for the country
25:16.7
and best for his political legacy
25:18.3
or her political legacy,
25:22.1
the neo-Reaganite playbook
25:23.4
because the American people
25:25.4
don't want to cut
25:26.7
and Medicare dramatically.
25:27.7
I can't borrow too much money
25:29.3
because interest rates
25:32.4
and better military,
25:33.7
is in a terrible state
25:34.9
and the defense industrial base
25:36.3
is in terrible shape
25:38.1
with the Ukraine stuff.
25:39.4
If you're on the Hill,
25:41.6
this kind of thing,
25:42.7
but if you're actually
25:43.5
responsible for it
25:44.4
at the National Security Council
25:45.4
or the Defense Department
25:46.3
or the president himself,
25:48.1
then you're going to say,
25:49.6
that's a nice talking point,
25:51.6
back here at reality,
25:52.8
I can't act like that.
25:54.2
And then, of course,
25:54.8
the Chinese and the Russians
25:55.9
are going to look at reality,
25:57.9
at the end of the day.
26:00.3
and then I think politically,
26:01.8
what you could say is,
26:04.1
to the neo-Reaganites,
26:06.9
what you're saying,
26:07.5
and the American people
26:08.3
don't support it.
26:10.2
Just to give you,
26:11.4
very illuminating,
26:14.0
the majority of Republican voters
26:15.6
want a smaller U.S. role
26:17.5
Half of independents
26:20.2
A majority of Democrats
26:21.9
according to that poll,
26:22.7
want a larger American role
26:24.1
but here's the thing,
26:25.6
very important for
26:26.3
frontline U.S. allies,
26:27.6
a separate poll by Reuters
26:28.8
found that a substantial
26:30.6
majority of Democrats
26:31.7
oppose U.S. military,
26:33.9
the use of the military force
26:36.0
any circumstances.
26:37.5
So what Democrats
26:38.7
when they're asked
26:39.5
is more development aid,
26:41.2
more engagement with the U.N.,
26:42.5
more international institutions.
26:43.8
They're not thinking
26:44.4
about going to war
26:45.3
with China or Russia,
26:48.1
So that's the political reality.
26:49.8
to the neo-Reaganites,
26:50.8
I can't do everything,
26:52.4
we're going to have
26:52.7
an international policy
26:54.0
that's going to be
26:55.8
that's going to stay
26:59.0
to the political base,
27:03.6
we're not going to get
27:04.4
in any stupid wars anymore
27:05.5
if we can possibly
27:08.9
I always point out
27:10.2
I was against the Iraq war,
27:11.3
I was against the
27:11.9
nation-building mission
27:14.1
I was against the
27:14.9
intervention in Libya,
27:16.9
et cetera, et cetera.
27:17.8
I've been, you know,
27:20.2
among other things.
27:24.6
with sharp objects,
27:26.9
we also have to live
27:27.6
in a world where there's,
27:29.0
the Chinese are in
27:29.5
a historic military buildup.
27:30.5
We can't ignore that.
27:32.7
re-industrialize America
27:35.0
industrial policy in America,
27:36.1
you can't let China
27:37.5
Because they're going
27:38.3
to control the world's
27:39.0
largest market area.
27:40.3
So I think that's how it,
27:42.2
and then, you know,
27:42.9
political strategy
27:44.3
you could find in between that.
27:46.4
the way the American system
27:49.4
that strategy will work.
27:51.3
I think it's going to be,
27:52.4
we will inevitably
27:53.2
follow it at some point.
27:58.2
some of the bad outcomes.
27:59.1
And that's the acme
28:02.8
doing that right now.
28:04.0
So what you're saying
28:05.2
there's going to be
28:05.9
proactive stewardship
28:07.5
if a good president
28:08.9
And there will be
28:09.4
sufficient deference
28:11.2
perhaps by the rest
28:13.8
stewardship and all,
28:17.0
it's the least bad
28:17.8
equilibrium for them.
28:20.9
that's my optimism.
28:21.7
That's my political
28:22.4
strategy aspiration,
28:24.2
whether it ends up like that.
28:25.0
I don't know, but.
28:26.3
No, I think in a very
28:28.2
we laid out the big picture,
28:31.8
how we're going to
28:32.3
approach this issue.
28:34.1
what was your experience?
28:35.6
to the degree that you can
28:38.5
as a senior official
28:39.5
during the Trump administration,
28:40.7
because during this time,
28:42.3
dealing with allies
28:43.1
like the Philippines
28:43.6
was quite tricky,
28:44.6
I would say, right?
28:45.9
like President Duterte
28:48.3
he didn't cause Trump,
28:49.3
but he caused Obama
28:50.3
questioning the alliance.
28:53.6
and President Duterte
28:54.3
had fantastic rapport,
28:55.5
at least at the personal level.
28:57.4
quite a challenging moment
28:59.9
between the two countries.
29:01.7
understanding of that?
29:05.2
are coming home to roost?
29:06.5
That something was
29:07.2
fundamentally lacking
29:09.8
dealing with some other
29:14.4
what was your understanding?
29:15.9
you're now out of government.
29:17.3
Yeah, yeah, sure.
29:20.0
with the Philippines
29:22.6
in the Trump administration.
29:24.3
My job was primarily,
29:25.5
I did have engagements
29:27.8
but my job was primarily
29:29.1
internally focused
29:31.6
I don't speak about
29:34.8
of the relationship,
29:36.2
the very important
29:37.0
relationship with Manila
29:37.8
with any kind of,
29:39.2
authority from that
29:40.1
sort of perspective.
29:41.3
people like Randy Shriver,
29:42.6
a good friend of mine
29:43.1
who I admire greatly,
29:44.4
he would have a much
29:45.2
clearer sense of what the,
29:50.5
very good friend,
29:51.1
someone I admire a lot too.
29:52.7
They would have a better,
29:54.4
is kind of looking at it
29:57.2
but also just watching
29:58.1
that relationship closely
30:01.2
it's interesting,
30:02.1
I would actually apply
30:03.0
a similar approach
30:05.8
to our domestic policy,
30:07.0
it's actually interesting.
30:07.6
I think this is relevant,
30:08.9
in looking at how
30:09.6
we're managing the relationship,
30:11.0
with South Korea right now.
30:15.2
I think what President Marcos
30:16.2
is doing is exceptional
30:17.7
and deserves our support
30:22.1
and we should facilitate that
30:23.9
in whatever way possible.
30:25.4
On the other hand,
30:26.0
President Duterte
30:26.7
presumably represents
30:28.5
some significant,
30:31.0
in Philippine society.
30:34.9
there are reasons for them.
30:36.9
some are probably
30:37.3
better than others
30:38.1
as the war weariness
30:41.2
Some of the reasons
30:41.7
are probably better than others.
30:43.0
But it is a political fact.
30:45.1
And it can be changed
30:48.0
But I think the best way
30:52.5
and be sensitive to it.
30:53.4
And that's, I think,
30:53.9
a really important part.
30:54.9
just to bring it back
30:55.5
to America for once,
30:56.6
I think of the political strategy
30:58.2
of a lot of those
30:59.0
neo-Reaganites today
31:00.2
who continue to hold
31:01.4
the levers of power.
31:03.0
It was interesting yesterday
31:03.8
in Foreign Policy,
31:05.2
who's a good reporter,
31:07.1
a lot of the committee chairs
31:08.2
are still in that
31:09.4
neo-Reaganite faction,
31:10.6
but they're retiring.
31:13.3
Their political strategy
31:14.3
is mystifying to me
31:15.1
because it involves
31:20.0
rather than engaging with them.
31:22.5
that's actually just going to
31:23.2
make their situation worse
31:24.4
and it makes it more likely
31:29.3
version of restraint.
31:33.2
since I hadn't kind of
31:34.0
thought of this connection,
31:34.5
but to the Philippines,
31:36.7
we need to support
31:37.7
President Marcos,
31:39.9
but we need to understand
31:41.0
that there is a significant
31:42.1
current in Philippine society
31:44.3
and in Philippine thinking
31:48.2
is there's a degree
31:49.8
about the United States.
31:50.8
So let's not pretend
31:52.0
that that's gone,
31:53.7
but let's work with it.
31:55.3
The analogy I use
31:58.3
obviously has been
32:00.7
the United States
32:09.6
or most powerful factor
32:11.6
in South Korean society
32:13.0
and the midterm elections,
32:16.0
the parliamentary elections,
32:19.5
They did not go well
32:20.0
for President Yun's party.
32:21.1
I don't want to comment about,
32:22.6
but just looking at it
32:23.3
from a strategic perspective,
32:25.2
I think we should assume
32:27.3
an enduring element
32:28.5
on the Japan issue,
32:30.6
obviously the kind of
32:31.6
more left-wing perspective
32:32.9
towards North Korea
32:33.6
that has not just disappeared.
32:36.7
that I would think about,
32:38.4
to the Philippines
32:38.9
is let's do as much
32:42.1
because we need to focus
32:42.7
on the military situation
32:43.7
and the defense of the Philippines
32:45.9
but we also should be
32:48.7
that this is still
32:50.7
and needs to be respected
32:53.5
even if we don't agree with it
32:56.5
that was a very good
32:58.0
diplomatic answer.
32:59.2
No, but it was substantive.
33:00.8
It was not diplomatic.
33:01.8
Well, I mean it actually.
33:02.5
I'm not trying to.
33:02.9
It wasn't vacuous.
33:04.8
It was substantive.
33:07.7
I would put it that way.
33:09.5
you're absolutely right.
33:13.1
Duterte could be easily
33:14.3
dismissed by some court
33:15.7
he was just some crazy guy,
33:18.3
don't worry about it.
33:19.6
there is a significant
33:21.6
minority at least
33:22.8
and influential folks,
33:25.1
including in my circles
33:27.4
it's an important alliance,
33:29.4
China is a threat,
33:30.6
but we were taken for granted
33:32.0
for far, far too long.
33:36.8
hundreds of billions of dollars
33:37.9
to some special allies
33:39.2
in some part of the world,
33:42.3
and Jordans of this world,
33:50.2
the 1979 context,
33:59.0
deficits on the Philippines part,
34:01.3
it would be unfair
34:02.0
to just blame the Philippines
34:03.3
for any short term.
34:04.7
Shortcomings and deficits
34:05.6
in this alliance.
34:06.6
And to be honest,
34:09.1
of the political spectrum
34:11.5
you don't want also
34:12.1
an alliance whereby
34:13.0
one side is a rentier,
34:16.0
it's just basing access
34:17.1
and the other side
34:17.8
is about weapons.
34:20.4
more or less symmetrical relationship.
34:23.2
people make the same point
34:24.1
about President Trump.
34:25.0
the people in NATO
34:27.8
And now it's like,
34:29.1
they got the attention
34:29.6
that President Trump
34:31.7
reflects very real sentiments
34:34.4
and structural factors
34:35.8
that need to be addressed
34:38.7
in the NATO alliance
34:39.5
and actually doing NATO a favor
34:43.5
to grapple with the issue
34:44.7
before it becomes too late.
34:49.7
I think President Marcos
34:50.6
is pursuing absolutely
34:51.6
the right policy,
34:52.8
but I think we did get
34:56.8
There probably was a degree
34:57.6
in which the United States
34:58.4
took Manila for granted.
35:00.7
now we've been put on notice.
35:01.9
And let's take it seriously.
35:03.6
And let's take the sting
35:04.6
out of that critique
35:09.1
for my own small part,
35:10.5
but just as an example,
35:12.2
we talked about when we met,
35:13.6
I spent a week in Manila.
35:15.8
to the Philippines before,
35:18.4
I need to spend some time here.
35:19.7
I need to talk to people.
35:22.0
I think that's the kind of,
35:23.0
just in a microcosm,
35:24.0
but that's the kind
35:24.5
of approach Americans,
35:25.7
instead of going to Germany
35:27.4
for the 5,000th time,
35:30.2
it takes a little bit longer
35:31.0
to get out to Southeast Asia,
35:32.2
but Asia is more important
35:34.2
So we should act accordingly.
35:36.9
Sorry to our friends,
35:38.7
that's the thing.
35:40.7
you don't have to apologize.
35:41.6
I've met many Americans
35:42.7
who say they have never
35:43.6
been to the Philippines
35:44.4
or they have just been
35:45.3
to the Philippines
35:46.8
these are ex-military people.
35:48.7
who serve in top positions.
35:52.1
I think this conversation
35:54.3
in a good moment,
35:57.0
awakening on all fronts.
36:00.1
everyone's talking about
36:00.9
a Trump 2.0 administration
36:02.7
and how should we deal with it.
36:04.3
And you can expect in Europe
36:05.8
what would be the rhetoric.
36:07.7
you can see they're already moving.
36:09.2
I think former Prime Minister Asa
36:10.8
just met former President Trump recently.
36:14.3
In the Philippines,
36:15.6
I think people are confident
36:16.8
that Marcos and Trump
36:18.9
would hit it off well
36:22.1
but they seem like,
36:23.2
This is an old relationship.
36:26.1
the mom who's still around,
36:27.1
had fantastic relationships.
36:31.9
you can Google it.
36:35.0
the Marcos spent a lot of time
36:38.0
So there's the New York connection
36:40.7
they were close with Reagan
36:43.8
So there's a lot of
36:45.2
intersectional networks.
36:48.3
Filipinos have a special,
36:50.1
given our history,
36:50.8
we have a special connection
36:54.7
I think the Philippine relationship
36:57.1
I think the Republicans
36:57.8
and President Trump
37:02.6
it's interesting,
37:04.5
that New York Times article
37:05.9
I give a lot of credit
37:06.8
to what people like
37:07.4
Eli Radner are doing
37:10.1
and Charlie Flynn
37:12.0
are really deserved
37:12.9
tremendous credit.
37:14.3
as the old Saturday Night Live,
37:16.4
That's the issue.
37:17.5
it's more a race,
37:18.3
we're trying to have a race
37:19.8
in terms of who would do better
37:21.3
and who would have more focus
37:24.9
that's where the dynamic
37:26.3
will be on the first island chain.
37:28.6
and I think this is where
37:29.5
we're going to transition
37:30.1
to perhaps the penultimate part
37:32.1
of our discussion for now
37:33.4
and I hope we'll have
37:34.2
more and more discussion
37:35.1
throughout the coming months.
37:39.1
I just want to also add,
37:40.3
I think one of the things
37:41.2
some of us Filipinas,
37:44.7
and I think many Americans
37:46.0
forget Philippines
37:47.6
of the United States.
37:48.8
I think sometimes
37:49.8
is that never happened.
37:51.9
we were colonized.
37:55.5
a special status,
37:58.1
from the American point of view,
38:00.9
the more Hispanic part in us
38:02.7
is angry at you gringos
38:05.3
from the revolution,
38:07.9
There's the part of us,
38:09.0
we beat the Espanols
38:10.5
and then you guys came in
38:11.5
and gringos took over.
38:13.2
But the thing is this,
38:14.1
let's talk about 21st century
38:15.3
and let's talk about
38:16.2
what's happening right now.
38:19.5
I think the argument here,
38:21.0
and you could see
38:21.7
both of us have been
38:22.6
making this argument,
38:24.7
how American can fight
38:28.5
in any major theater.
38:30.5
the consensus is like
38:33.2
is the best of America.
38:35.0
it depends on what...
38:36.4
If you have Russia
38:37.2
already in Ukraine,
38:42.9
we know the development
38:43.6
is also in the middle.
38:44.4
It's a tricky situation,
38:45.7
but things are moving
38:49.7
what is your reading
38:50.3
of this new emergency fund
38:51.8
passed by the Senate
38:54.0
by President Biden?
38:57.2
if I'm not mistaken.
38:58.1
it's a huge amount of money.
38:59.3
Huge amount of money.
39:00.5
We were talking about.
39:01.3
One of the leading members
39:02.3
of the Senate was saying
39:03.2
it's not a lot of money,
39:06.5
it's $60.84 billion
39:09.4
and $26 billion for Israel,
39:10.9
$9 billion for humanitarian needs,
39:12.7
and then $8 billion
39:13.8
for the Indo-Pacific.
39:15.1
I just want to be clear
39:15.8
about the numbers.
39:16.3
The entire Indo-Pacific.
39:17.2
Entire Indo-Pacific,
39:18.1
not the Philippines alone,
39:20.9
I think Taiwan is like
39:21.8
$2 billion or less.
39:23.5
As Mike Gallagher said
39:24.9
in one of his more lucid
39:26.0
commentary on this,
39:34.5
it's kind of puerile,
39:39.5
and I say that advisedly,
39:41.1
because we are making choices.
39:44.1
And what's very frustrating
39:46.1
is that we are not
39:47.1
facing those choices.
39:49.1
I would actually prefer it
39:50.9
if people would say,
39:53.3
we're choosing Europe,
40:00.3
is a lot of money,
40:03.0
especially Republicans,
40:04.0
but the country as a whole,
40:05.6
is very concerned
40:09.2
And people are war-weary.
40:12.2
that amount of money,
40:13.4
that money is zero-sum.
40:17.0
sorry Dick Cheney,
40:17.7
deficits do matter.
40:19.5
And Jay Powell has said
40:20.8
that interest rates
40:21.5
are becoming huge.
40:23.4
a president who came in,
40:29.5
about this as possible.
40:30.6
I think the Chinese
40:31.3
have plenty of reasons
40:32.4
why they would use
40:34.2
against the United States.
40:35.4
As Eli Ratner has said,
40:36.5
not just to solve
40:37.3
the Taiwan issue,
40:38.0
but to drive the Americans
40:38.9
out of the Western Pacific.
40:40.0
You mentioned the example
40:41.1
of the Philippines.
40:41.9
It's worth pointing out
40:42.7
the United States,
40:43.8
at least as I understand it,
40:45.0
our initial war goals
40:47.4
were not the acquisition
40:48.5
of the Philippines,
40:49.3
but because of the dynamic
40:50.5
created by the defeat
40:54.2
German intervention,
40:55.3
we ended up going
40:56.2
into the Philippines.
40:56.6
We stumbled into empire.
40:58.2
the British use today.
40:58.9
which is unfortunate,
40:59.7
but if you're China
41:00.6
and you defeat the Americans
41:02.8
over the Western Pacific,
41:04.2
why don't you solve
41:05.0
the Philippines question
41:06.6
from a position of advantage?
41:08.1
And they are building
41:08.8
a military to do that.
41:14.0
if a war happens,
41:15.5
is with military forces.
41:17.2
economic sanctions
41:17.9
are frankly a joke.
41:21.1
the Russians obviously
41:22.1
are not being influenced
41:22.9
in any material way.
41:24.9
The Chinese are not really,
41:26.1
the Chinese are doing,
41:28.3
the Russian war effort
41:30.0
just without violating
41:31.2
the European sanctions
41:33.4
even as they prepare
41:34.2
to be sanctioned,
41:35.0
which is telling.
41:36.4
And then even worse,
41:38.6
this is really pathetic
41:39.7
that this has happened,
41:42.6
about the inutility
41:43.6
of economic sanctions.
41:49.5
of US forces in Europe,
41:50.5
the Supreme Allied
41:52.1
commander of Europe,
41:53.0
the Russian military
41:53.9
has reconstituted already.
41:57.5
don't take it from me,
41:58.6
I thought it would take
41:59.1
a few more years,
42:00.3
but it's already reconstituted.
42:01.6
Their defense industry
42:03.3
and the North Koreans
42:05.4
who were probably
42:06.0
kind of cut out somewhat
42:07.6
are basically helping them out
42:10.3
as they go along.
42:14.0
the war in Ukraine
42:14.9
is not going well.
42:16.9
with the Ukrainian cause,
42:18.1
but I think we've talked
42:19.4
for strategic prioritization.
42:21.6
And so in this context
42:24.6
don't take it from me,
42:25.7
look what Sam Paparo
42:27.5
where we are not,
42:28.9
we're doing better,
42:30.1
but we are not doing it
42:31.1
as well as the other side.
42:32.8
And as Top Gun says,
42:34.0
there are no points
42:34.7
for second place.
42:35.6
If you're a runner
42:37.8
over the off season
42:38.9
and you lost weight,
42:39.9
that's not enough
42:41.5
you defeat your opponent.
42:44.2
It's common sense.
42:49.4
did not use the opportunity
42:53.3
towards the Pacific,
42:57.5
a clearer strategy
43:00.7
and not to mention
43:05.8
such opportunities
43:08.2
these triple bank shot
43:10.5
that things are going
43:12.2
I mean, just today
43:15.1
another propaganda
43:17.8
the defense industrial base
43:18.6
by funding Ukraine.
43:21.0
because the money
43:21.9
to the defense industrial base
43:22.8
is going to be used
43:26.6
and the defense industrial base
43:28.4
not just because of money,
43:31.7
because of the scarcity
43:34.0
So we're choosing Ukraine.
43:36.5
And where I don't think
43:38.7
I don't see a path
43:40.1
for the Ukrainians
43:42.1
I think they could,
43:42.8
they could have a viable
43:43.7
defensive strategy
43:45.3
to something like Korea.
43:46.8
That's a rational goal.
43:49.0
But almost immediately
43:51.0
after the supplemental pass,
43:52.7
we're now seeing,
43:53.6
if you look at my Twitter,
43:54.2
I've highlighted a bunch of these,
43:55.5
where they're already
43:56.5
forecasting the need
43:57.3
for another supplemental.
44:02.3
such a triumph for China
44:05.7
and I'm not even mentioning
44:07.1
where we're blowing through
44:08.1
critical munitions,
44:15.9
of the Iranian missiles,
44:20.2
without acknowledging
44:23.0
we are making decisions
44:31.3
and political class
44:32.3
that we are not doing this
44:33.8
with forethought.
44:35.3
I think any business
44:36.6
that was run like this,
44:37.6
they would fire the leadership
44:38.7
because they're not
44:40.2
openly going through.
44:42.5
Like, I would object,
44:43.9
I would object on principle,
44:46.0
but it wouldn't be such
44:47.3
a profound failure.
44:51.0
Well, it would be,
44:52.4
if it were at least
44:53.4
done consciously,
44:54.6
then at least we could
44:57.8
international conversation.
44:59.9
in fairytale land.
45:02.9
and the candidate,
45:04.4
the people who are going to pay
45:05.3
are frontline allies.
45:06.8
another example is like,
45:08.3
you got Kirk Campbell
45:09.1
out there talking about
45:11.1
nuclear deterrent
45:14.2
the North Koreans
45:14.6
have dozens of nuclear weapons.
45:16.3
Our missile defenses
45:22.7
I think fewer than
45:24.4
probably know that
45:25.1
we have an extended
45:25.9
nuclear deterrent commitment
45:29.5
if the North Koreans
45:31.1
particularly in the context
45:32.0
of a war with China,
45:35.1
in the Pacific Northwest
45:37.6
is that a realistic,
45:38.9
is that a credible strategy?
45:44.3
Let's talk about that.
45:45.5
I really appreciate
45:46.7
this intervention.
45:47.7
just to be clear,
45:48.3
I think both of us,
45:49.7
our hearts go to people
45:52.1
we definitely disagree.
45:53.9
This is where you and I
45:55.0
will definitely disagree
45:55.8
with John Mersheimer.
45:57.3
I'm not going to go
45:59.2
I think on Russia,
46:00.0
he got it like 100% wrong.
46:02.8
Russia has some agency.
46:04.1
Exactly, exactly.
46:06.5
I'm sure if someone
46:07.6
less Putin was there,
46:08.9
it probably would be
46:09.6
a different world.
46:12.8
about 90 billion.
46:14.4
in a reasonable world,
46:15.8
are you looking at
46:16.5
what kind of split?
46:17.8
50 billion to in the Pacific,
46:19.7
20 billion to Ukraine?
46:21.5
just an idea, right?
46:23.2
order of magnitude.
46:24.9
Order of magnitude.
46:25.5
And what is that?
46:27.3
60 billion to the Pacific,
46:29.3
20 billion to Ukraine,
46:30.9
and 20 billion to Israel.
46:32.2
something like that,
46:33.1
And then something for the border
46:34.2
and changes in policy
46:36.5
That's a separate,
46:37.4
Speaking of this,
46:38.8
so that we don't run
46:41.1
we're calling for
46:42.0
abandonment of Ukraine.
46:43.8
just the first level,
46:45.4
what do you think
46:46.2
is the reasonable strategy?
46:48.1
any reasonable strategy
46:49.0
would say we should put Ukraine
46:50.8
to negotiate peace
46:52.0
from a position of strength.
46:55.0
I think the right,
46:56.9
what General Zaluzhny
46:59.9
made a lot of sense to me.
47:01.6
the Russians have,
47:02.5
what Mearsheimer says,
47:04.1
that they have more money
47:04.9
and people and weapons
47:05.9
and they're highly resolute
47:09.1
the Ukrainian population
47:11.7
a defensive strategy,
47:13.3
taking advantage of technology,
47:14.9
there was just something
47:15.4
about how the Ukrainians
47:16.3
are pulling Abrams tanks
47:17.3
out of the front line
47:18.5
because tanks are so vulnerable
47:20.9
and electronic warfare
47:22.0
has become more competitive.
47:26.3
defensive fortifications
47:29.1
of what the Russians did
47:32.1
all these sort of things.
47:33.8
a lot of what I'm doing
47:35.9
a credible signal
47:39.6
send a credible signal
47:41.3
that they really do need
47:42.1
to do this, right?
47:42.9
The problem with what
47:43.7
President Biden has done
47:46.3
having all these nice photo ops
47:47.5
and being nice to the Europeans,
47:48.6
he's undercut the urgency
47:50.0
of the burden shifting,
47:51.4
which is inevitable
47:52.2
because it reflects
47:53.1
structural factors.
47:53.9
he's actually hurting
47:54.7
the Transatlantic Alliance,
47:56.1
rather than helping.
47:57.6
and the fact that there could be
48:00.5
is actually helping
48:02.8
the necessary sense
48:03.6
of urgency and realism.
48:07.8
Macron says a lot of things.
48:09.0
The follow-through
48:11.0
a European minister
48:15.9
may need to go 3.5%.
48:17.3
The Poles are doing,
48:19.2
political divide.
48:21.1
We need to encourage that
48:22.3
exactly to give them
48:24.0
a position of strength
48:26.8
even if it's temporary.
48:27.8
the Russians are going
48:29.3
So, we need to be realistic.
48:30.9
But, the point is,
48:31.7
the Americans can't be
48:32.6
the ones overwhelmingly
48:34.3
shouldering the load,
48:35.3
which is the case.
48:38.6
I'll tell you what.
48:42.2
And, behind the scenes,
48:43.6
I actually just here,
48:45.2
of European friends.
48:46.2
I think, behind the scenes,
48:47.1
there is a recognition
48:50.4
to step up the game.
48:53.0
if Trump wins again,
48:54.6
there is going to be
48:55.2
the usual diplomatism.
48:56.1
It's a diplomatic kind of,
48:58.5
if I can put it that way.
48:59.7
But, behind the scenes,
49:02.2
there's this idea of,
49:04.2
Europe has to be jolted out.
49:07.3
and to a lesser degree,
49:08.7
would have to really
49:09.4
step up their game, right?
49:11.3
Germany is by far
49:12.5
the biggest economy.
49:13.7
of the European economy.
49:14.6
So, it's mostly about Germany.
49:15.8
the Poles are doing their part.
49:17.3
The Brits talk a bigger game
49:18.6
than they follow through on.
49:20.3
other countries will plug in
49:21.5
if the Germans do their part.
49:22.6
So, that's why I spend
49:23.2
a lot of time on the Germans.
49:26.0
But, I think it's
49:27.2
for their own benefit.
49:28.6
for the benefit of the
49:29.5
countries that are most vulnerable
49:30.9
to Russian aggression,
49:31.8
which, by the way,
49:32.6
were the countries
49:33.1
that the Germans occupied
49:34.7
So, they have a special
49:35.5
obligation to help them.
49:39.6
you're a little bit more optimistic
49:40.9
with the Poles of this world.
49:43.4
has stepped up to the game.
49:44.9
Poland's been great.
49:46.0
They have been doing their job.
49:47.3
And so, I really elevate them
49:48.5
whenever I get the chance.
49:49.4
I talk to the Poles all the time.
49:51.0
They don't like my prioritization
49:53.0
if I were Polish,
49:53.8
I would be arguing
49:55.5
But, they understand
49:56.1
where I'm coming from.
49:57.5
And, I think there's an alignment
49:59.8
where the Poles are doing...
50:01.0
The Poles trust the Americans,
50:02.9
but they want to make sure
50:04.0
that they don't overweight
50:05.3
on the American commitment
50:07.6
their own very significant
50:08.7
defense capability,
50:09.4
which makes it easier
50:10.3
for the American people
50:11.2
to substantiate that commitment.
50:13.2
Since the commitment...
50:13.9
And, this is the thing,
50:15.5
this guy in the FT
50:16.7
for saying that we would
50:17.5
withhold forces in the event
50:18.9
to your point about
50:21.9
it's only rational
50:24.0
for an American president,
50:25.4
whether it's President Biden
50:26.2
or President Trump,
50:27.4
to withhold forces
50:28.7
in the event of a conflict
50:30.0
because Asia's more important.
50:31.6
That's, like, our...
50:32.7
our stated strategy.
50:34.1
So, I'm just following
50:35.5
we don't have enough.
50:38.7
of the key forces
50:39.4
into a war in Europe
50:40.7
and they're tied down
50:42.1
the Chinese would be crazy
50:44.2
Then, we get a war situation
50:45.4
and Europe is worse off
50:46.4
because we have to...
50:47.2
We have to, you know,
50:50.5
out of the rest of the world.
50:52.8
who's doing anybody
50:54.3
by hiding that fact?
50:55.6
That's not helping
50:56.9
They should understand that.
50:59.0
That doesn't mean
51:00.4
That means, like,
51:00.9
here's what we can do.
51:02.8
I've made too many loans.
51:04.6
Here's what I can pay back.
51:08.8
I mean, obviously,
51:10.4
I know your answer,
51:11.6
this has to be asked.
51:14.1
are deliberately supporting
51:15.7
at least two or three powers
51:17.1
to bog you guys down
51:20.2
Because this is what we see.
51:21.0
It's too good, Cui.
51:24.1
oh, the Chinese know
51:25.2
what they're doing.
51:26.2
Blinken's over there.
51:27.0
Oh, we're going to sanction...
51:29.8
the NATO ambassador,
51:30.5
is trying to put pressure
51:31.2
on them in the UN.
51:34.5
oh, I can't believe
51:35.2
they're doing it.
51:36.7
these people are not stupid.
51:39.0
they're probably smarter
51:44.0
they're actively,
51:45.9
Professor Moriarty,
51:47.4
from the Sherlock Holmes story,
51:48.2
behind every single shot.
51:53.2
of this meddlesome priest,
51:54.4
the story of Henry II,
51:59.4
in the Middle East,
52:01.9
I'll be behind you.
52:02.6
I don't actually need to know,
52:05.1
did Putin tell Xi
52:06.5
exactly what's going to happen?
52:09.7
That's not even necessary,
52:12.3
China is in great shape.
52:14.7
they're having economic problems.
52:16.2
That's a different story.
52:17.8
from a strategic point of view,
52:20.3
they are doing very well
52:21.9
in the last few years.
52:24.5
almost a whole year's worth
52:25.7
of SM-6 missiles,
52:27.3
which are very expensive
52:29.3
both for air defense
52:30.8
Those are critical
52:32.6
We shot a whole year's worth,
52:35.1
against the Houthis
52:36.2
with no discernible result
52:38.3
by the President's own admission,
52:40.2
his special envoy
52:42.1
a diplomatic solution.
52:47.0
here's some money,
52:48.4
for no particular purpose.
52:51.6
the situation is.
52:53.0
just stick the box,
52:54.5
we did something about,
52:55.7
what they were doing
52:56.9
or something like that.
52:58.3
what is the ideal situation
53:03.3
to the Biden administration,
53:07.9
there are a lot of smart people
53:09.7
we know their way of thinking,
53:11.2
fantastic people,
53:12.5
in terms of their understanding
53:13.6
of the China challenge.
53:17.5
in the diplomatic nice mode.
53:20.3
That's as nice as I'll go.
53:21.3
Let's give it up.
53:24.8
there are certain things
53:27.3
there's the trilaterals,
53:31.7
there's the AUKUS,
53:33.1
now there's what I call
53:43.0
the great wall of democracy,
53:46.0
the counter-hegemonic
53:47.5
coalition and all.
53:50.3
the ideal situation
53:52.7
the next president
54:00.7
you have very powerful
54:02.3
and also powerful
54:03.1
allies in the Middle East,
54:04.7
in the recent rounds
54:07.9
it's really about
54:08.6
helping the Koreas
54:11.7
to get it together.
54:13.9
about your understanding
54:14.7
of how should the America
54:17.4
This year is done.
54:21.1
really pointedly.
54:23.2
I think the Biden administration,
54:25.5
and what the military
54:27.1
the military side
54:27.9
is very encouraging,
54:29.1
but it's inadequate.
54:29.9
And that's not because
54:31.1
any comment on him.
54:33.2
with macro factors
54:33.9
in terms of overall
54:35.0
orientation of the administration
54:36.3
and then structural factors
54:40.2
But it's inadequate.
54:43.4
the Biden administration's
54:44.2
Asia policy will look great
54:45.4
if there's no war
54:47.0
or Cuba-style crisis
54:48.9
But I think there's
54:49.5
a very real chance
54:51.4
especially if we continue
54:53.4
the military capacity.
54:55.0
Because these multi,
54:56.6
these mini-lateral
55:00.8
They're good in some,
55:03.0
especially if they lead
55:05.1
in the military situation,
55:07.1
in places like Japan
55:08.0
and in the Philippines,
55:09.6
albeit inadequately.
55:11.0
And that's the key point.
55:14.2
they give a false sense
55:18.7
they're not moving
55:21.3
if we have a bunch
55:27.8
of the military balance
55:30.4
Adequate to the threat.
55:32.1
That's the point.
55:32.5
There's no points
55:32.9
for second place.
55:35.0
I think there is a risk
55:37.0
to a Chinese perception
55:38.3
of being encircled
55:40.4
and even strangled,
55:41.2
which is the term
55:41.7
that Xi Jinping apparently used.
55:42.8
So, I'd say it's their
55:43.8
aggressive potential response.
55:48.8
the economic measures.
55:50.9
ain't going to do anything
55:52.6
a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
55:53.9
They're not going to invade,
55:55.3
you're not going to defeat
55:55.9
the PLA with hashtags, right?
55:58.6
cold, hard steel.
55:60.0
And I don't want to,
56:01.3
we should speak softly
56:02.1
and carry a big stick.
56:03.2
I think there's been
56:09.6
but we need to see
56:10.4
what the results are
56:12.6
what Poparo said,
56:13.5
to what the Chinese
56:14.9
and the North Koreans
56:16.3
And that's the big problem.
56:20.0
kind of tone down
56:21.8
some of the stuff,
56:26.4
on the concrete stuff
56:29.0
the military balance
56:31.6
that's not a matter
56:33.0
of having a meeting
56:35.0
if you need to have
56:35.9
the meeting at Camp David,
56:37.3
but maybe you don't make
56:38.0
such a big deal out of it
56:38.9
in terms of the photo ops
56:41.0
all that sort of thing.
56:42.9
because you can end up
56:44.1
of both worlds, right?
56:45.4
Antagonist China,
56:47.0
but at the same time,
56:49.0
That's what I feel
56:49.8
like we're doing.
56:50.5
I could guess that.
56:53.2
on the South China Sea issue.
56:57.2
What is your read
56:58.1
of what's happening
56:59.3
Because, you know,
57:00.8
gray zone strategy
57:02.5
anything short of,
57:05.9
they're using water cannons
57:07.0
that are 10 times
57:08.0
the power of Mike Tyson.
57:10.0
if you can put it
57:11.2
aggressive punch power
57:13.2
Philippine naval officers.
57:15.7
the sense in the Philippines
57:16.7
is we're doing our part,
57:18.6
perhaps even more
57:19.4
than anyone expected,
57:20.7
given our capabilities
57:23.3
What do you think
57:27.2
Without being patronizing,
57:29.3
can still do the resupply
57:30.8
but what is the optimal
57:31.6
American response
57:35.2
US will be dragged
57:36.8
if something goes crazy there.
57:38.2
What should be a...
57:39.5
I think we need to stand
57:40.5
with the Philippines
57:42.3
we need to be prudent together
57:43.5
and we should plan together,
57:48.4
has put its neck out a lot
57:50.9
basing and access
57:52.9
I actually don't know
57:54.0
what the Chinese are thinking.
57:55.3
It's a bit mystifying to me
57:56.2
because it seems to be
57:57.3
infuriating to the Philippines
57:58.7
without being truly intimidating.
58:03.0
alienate President Marcos
58:05.1
the Philippine population.
58:09.4
obviously not dumb.
58:10.3
I don't know what they're doing.
58:11.5
I don't know what exactly,
58:12.9
I think what we're doing now,
58:15.7
within the realm of,
58:17.3
the right answer.
58:18.4
the South China Sea,
58:20.1
a lot of it's hard to deal with
58:21.7
because the Chinese
58:24.1
they're not seizing
58:25.6
They're creating new land
58:26.7
in places where they just have
58:27.8
the capacity advantage.
58:30.4
I think it's a very difficult issue
58:33.5
and certainly very concerning.
58:37.8
what is your understanding
58:38.7
of the Taiwan situation?
58:40.6
Are you of the belief that
58:44.6
how prepared we are
58:47.2
or this is all just
58:48.2
blah, blah, blah by China?
58:51.7
I think there's no peaceful
58:52.9
unification scenario
58:54.0
in the near term,
58:55.6
And if Xi Jinping believes
58:57.0
that Taiwan is necessary
58:58.7
for the great rejuvenation
58:59.7
of the Chinese nation
59:00.3
or that Taiwan might continue
59:01.3
moving away from them
59:02.3
and also there's the
59:03.7
strangulation issues
59:04.5
at the macroeconomic level,
59:06.0
I think then war becomes
59:07.7
a very rational option
59:08.9
if they can succeed
59:14.0
and my main concern there,
59:15.5
is our inadequate attention
59:17.3
given the scale of the threat
59:18.9
and Taiwan's manifest
59:21.8
relative to the scale
59:23.3
I think they're moving
59:23.7
in the right direction
59:24.4
on asymmetric defense
59:26.2
but it's ridiculous
59:27.3
that that country spends
59:30.2
they should be spending 10%
59:31.3
if it were up to me.
59:32.1
I don't know if I were them,
59:35.1
And they should be making
59:35.8
the case for prioritizing Taiwan.
59:37.4
It's absolutely absurd
59:38.4
to have people like
59:41.3
be calling for Ukraine.
59:43.3
they could have gotten
59:46.9
the number one argument
59:49.9
probably the most effective
59:52.6
to try to help Taiwan
59:54.8
the Taiwanese don't seem
59:55.7
to think they did it.
60:01.0
people will remember
60:04.1
think it was urgent
60:05.2
enough for themselves.
60:06.1
So, it makes my arguments
60:08.9
And I've said this
60:09.7
to them directly.
60:11.4
And you're concerned
60:12.4
of potential also
60:13.3
of technological complacency.
60:17.3
Russia didn't do very well
60:18.7
during its invasion
60:19.6
and we saw the superiority
60:20.8
of NATO weapon systems.
60:23.6
from our analysis
60:24.2
of where the war is going.
60:25.7
there is also a risk
60:27.7
these are just a bunch
60:29.3
authoritarian powers, right?
60:30.6
We can take care of them.
60:31.7
Well, that's obviously not,
60:32.8
the Ukrainians don't think
60:34.3
If you read the press,
60:35.1
the electronic warfare drones,
60:37.5
the Russians have adapted
60:39.4
we've learned from the conflict
60:41.0
but presumably so
60:42.5
It goes both ways.
60:43.0
So, we should definitely
60:45.7
to be so arrogant?
60:49.0
We were very successful
60:52.5
We were successful
60:53.6
against the Taliban
60:54.5
in the initial phases,
60:56.9
We did not succeed
60:58.6
and we were fought
61:00.6
and the Chinese pushed us
61:01.6
halfway down the peninsula
61:07.6
and economically.
61:09.3
we should go back
61:10.5
to that post-Vietnam idea
61:15.9
where we are right now.
61:19.4
you want to add something?
61:19.9
Thank you, Richard.
61:20.1
I know I have to go.
61:21.0
I just said I have to run.
61:21.7
I could see that.
61:22.4
Thank you so much.
61:25.0
just as I expected.
61:26.9
this conversation
61:27.6
and thank you so much,
61:31.1
how can people follow you
61:32.7
and where can they find
61:34.2
your works and books
61:35.2
and how can they follow you?
61:41.8
the Marathon Initiative,
61:43.0
you can check out online
61:44.0
for a longer article.
61:45.1
I have a lot of interviews
61:47.8
The Strategy of Denial
61:49.7
from Yale University Press
61:52.1
it should be available
61:53.2
but also it's been
61:56.1
and Chinese on Taiwan.
61:58.3
Congratulations on that.
61:59.7
Thank you so much, Elbridge
62:00.5
and have a lovely
62:01.2
and productive day.
62:01.7
Thank you, Richard.
62:23.2
Thank you very much.
62:24.4
dun sa mga nakikinig.
62:32.7
so based on the reports
62:34.8
he's a frontrunner,
62:35.8
one of the frontrunners
62:36.6
to become the next
62:37.6
National Security Advisor
62:39.9
a very, very high
62:43.2
the next president.
62:44.1
As you guys know,
62:45.8
critical of Trump
62:47.3
for a myriad of reasons.
62:49.7
Not as a Filipino
62:50.4
but for other reasons.
62:51.9
I think for the Philippines,
62:53.2
Trump was not the worst thing
62:57.0
but Elbridge Colby
62:58.5
is a very interesting guy
62:59.6
because if you look
63:00.2
at Elbridge Colby,
63:01.3
not only did he play
63:02.1
a very important role
63:03.0
during the Trump 1
63:05.4
but I think he has
63:06.9
proper understanding
63:11.3
and also how America
63:12.2
should help allies
63:13.0
like the Philippines.
63:15.1
So I think the proper
63:16.1
patriotic Filipino position
63:17.6
is not just to say
63:18.7
marami tayong pagkakulang,
63:21.1
I think totoo naman,
63:22.5
marami tayong kapalpakan
63:25.5
I think people like Colby
63:26.5
properly understand
63:29.3
push up the Philippines,
63:33.3
our defensive capabilities.
63:35.7
As you could see,
63:37.0
his understanding
63:37.5
is in the Middle East.
63:44.2
where these arguments,
63:49.4
that he also understands
63:52.3
for a peace negotiation
63:53.8
the best strategy
63:55.1
is to put Ukraine
63:56.0
on a strong position
63:59.4
a realistic thing
64:00.1
because I just don't think
64:01.0
militarily you can
64:02.8
from what they have
64:03.5
already occupied.
64:05.6
And the idea of U.S.
64:07.6
three different wars
64:08.5
in the Middle East,
64:10.0
in Eastern Europe,
64:10.9
and then in Asia,
64:11.6
it's just not going to work.
64:16.8
patriotic Filipino,
64:17.9
my understanding is
64:18.8
the best we can do
64:21.1
out of our alliance,
64:22.5
especially with the
64:24.2
but also a whole host
64:24.9
of other countries.
64:25.8
I'm going to write something
64:29.5
that we can have.
64:31.0
yun lang sa akin.
64:32.3
I know may mga nainis sa akin
64:35.0
500 million lang sa Philippines.
64:37.0
it's easy to say,
64:38.0
but 500 million is
64:39.1
four times the 100 million
64:42.4
tama naman sinisabi
64:47.9
And the reality is
64:48.7
the Philippines has been
64:49.4
taken for granted
64:50.1
for a very long time.
64:51.4
We took ourselves
64:54.7
we have to make sure
64:56.6
out of this alliance.
64:59.4
have F-16 fighters,
65:00.6
if Ukraine is about
65:01.4
to get F-16 fighters,
65:03.9
Philippines should get
65:04.5
also F-16 fighters.
65:06.2
the most powerful
65:10.5
and soon the biggest
65:11.5
Air Force in the world.
65:12.9
this is not a joke.
65:16.9
behind the scenes
65:21.4
of very important
65:22.7
American strategists
65:24.5
important decision-making
65:29.8
where I'm coming from.
65:32.6
and help the Philippines
65:37.7
mag Super Saiyan 2
65:41.2
nags Super Saiyan 1 eh.
65:42.7
We have to push it
65:43.6
to Super Saiyan 2.
65:45.6
kaya yan on our own.
65:47.0
We really have to get
65:49.1
And we have to get
65:49.7
those good weapon systems
65:51.7
Kailangan natin yan.
65:53.1
this is the position
65:53.7
that I have here.
65:56.7
I'm more critical of Trump
65:57.9
than Biden in general.
66:00.1
a lot of problems
66:00.9
with Democrats nowadays.
66:03.2
I'm habang usapan
66:04.1
yung mga woke-woke stuff
66:06.7
as much as I consider
66:07.6
myself progressive,
66:09.5
with a lot of things
66:10.2
that is happening
66:10.6
with the Democrats.
66:11.4
But I'm also critical
66:16.0
with some of the things
66:17.2
that some Republicans
66:18.3
in terms of prioritizing China.
66:21.2
should be focused on China.
66:22.6
And we have to get
66:24.3
their alliances and all.
66:26.1
thank you very much, guys.
66:27.3
Maraming salamat.
66:28.5
And talk to you soon.
